The idea that history repeats itself has much become over-used and cliched. History does not repeat itself. Instead, similar elements constitute an ostensible pattern. We find this method often being used to analyze wars, in order to see the extent to which one conflict can bear a parallel. This much can be said about the Korean War of 1950 and the Kosovo Conflict.

 

In 1999, many Western newspapers splashed the word “onslaught” all over their newspapers in reaction to Nato’s unprecedented decision to directly intervene in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The issue was very much black and white: Milosevic was a bad person and it was incumbent upon the military alliance, working under a moral imperative, to go in and save the Kosovars from ethnic cleansing. In this conflict, there was neither any mistake as to where the diplomatic leverage was coming from – Washington and London – nor was there any doubt as to what orders General Wesley Clarke, the dashing Vietnam veteran, was to take.

 

Most of the time, he followed instructions. In last month’s [April-May 2000?] BBC2 television programme by BBC Journalist Alan Little[1] on the conflict, the former Balkans correspondent alluded to a point in time when Clarke came at odds with strategy, and consequently threatened to resign. If he had, there would have been no real outcry. However, what, generally, are the ramifications if the military man in the campaign disagrees with strategy, publicly expresses it, and tries to haul it over his civilian Head of State?

 

Generally, in a democracy like that of America, differences of opinion are welcomed eagerly. It is this in particular that reinforces the democratic ideal. However, even in a democracy, there must be a time and a place for everything – both in peacetime as in war. This generic rule applies to both the Head of State as well as the military man. As Dr.Palo argued in the lecture of March 16^th 2000, “acting generals must be kept out of politics, and when we say politics, we mean foreign policy.” About this, there must arguably be no question. This paper is about that question.

 

At the height of the summer of June 1950, the Korean War broke out. It was to become “one of the first victims of the Cold War” as Michael Kort[2]put it. Moreover, it became the first ever war since the end of the Second World War that ironically pitted members of the Security Council against each other under the inconspicuous guise of proxies.

 

Most significantly, the Korean War epitomized and emphasized the Cold War at its apogee, where the United States – ostensibly fighting to ward off Communism – would actively engage in what was to become a US-sponsored UN action to fight off aggression by the North Koreans.

 

The sobriquets – “forgotten” and “unknown” – have become synonymous with the Korean war because of the way in which it became sandwiched between the Second World War “which preceded it by only a few years, and the Vietnam War, which loomed so large because it lasted so long and deeply divided the American people.”[3]

 

As if this were not enough, the conflict itself is neither short of complexity, characters or controversy. It is complex because of the genesis of the conflict. Many a historian has debated, as we equally did in the March 16th lecture, that one of the reasons why the Soviet seat was absent the day the Security Council adapted US resolution calling on all UN members to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea”[4] lies in something more sinister.

 

As quoted in the same lecture, “in Stalin’s view, the risk of the Soviet’s absence – in other words, the inability to veto a resolution – was less than the strategic advantage of stressing by demonstration the Sino-Soviet alliance on the one hand, and the unmasking of the UN as a voting machine obedient to America.”[5]

 

In other words, Stalin’s real objective was to show the world how the United Nations was an American puppet, and by doing so, he was implicitly indicating support for the aggressor North Koreans. Dr.Palo argued that this argument was a specious on, predicated on speculation with no evidence to substantiate it. Actually, the truth may never be known, but one thing that remains clear is the way in which interpretations over the absent seat have become increasingly subjective.

 

That said, it does not prevent the conflict from bringing out a slew of characters that were to mark their name in the history of this war. To name but a few, Secretary-of-State Dean Acheson, Kim Il Yung, Syngman Rhee, then UN Secretary-General Trygvie Lie; British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, President Truman, and last but not least, General MacArthur.

 

It would be the latter’s controversial actions and reactions in the Korean theatre of war that would raise the spectre of the radically aggressive style of foreign policy that Truman felt had died with Hitler. In fact, John G. Stoessinger, author of Crusaders and Pragmatists, lends credence to this idea: “The North Korean attack, in {Truman's} view was reminiscent of the aggressive acts unleashed by the German, Italian and Japanese military adventurers."[6]

 

Contrary to what one may think, it appears President Truman's knee-jerk -- or what Dr.Palo calls Pavlovian -- reaction to North Korean's crossing of the 38^th parallel, ostensibly came out of a veritable desire to avoid the spectre of war.  Whilst one may be quick to judge him, we have the benefit of hindsight on our side; he did not. He truly believed that "unless Communist belligerency was deterred promptly and effectively, a third world war between Communist and non-Communist states would inevitably ensue."[7] Meisler lends weight to this when he describes how Truman expressed apprehension to his Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, that "in the final analysis, I did this for the United Nations. I believed in the League of Nations. It failed.  Lots of people thought it failed because we were not in it to back it up.  If a collective system under the UN can work, it must be made to work…"[8]

 

If this language appears to be consistent with Wilsonian rhetoric, it was hardly surprising.  This is because Truman, despite his highly controversial decision to drop atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945, was, in his heart of hearts, a democrat with a capital "D."  This is best exemplified by Stoessinger's analysis of the President: "Truman was an optimist. Harmony among nations was possible, he believed, provided there was a collective organization to sustain and enforce peace."[9] Consequently, if it was to be the UN to do it, then he was hell-bent on translating United Nations action through the United States.

 

That said, as much as Truman believed in the latter, he equally believed in a strong chief executive.  He felt that "whenever, a President weakly deferred to the Congress, the public interest was the real loser."[10] Spanier, author of The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, could not agree more: "it is the President and his chosen advisers who, both formally and effectively, determine the over-all 'grand strategy' which the country pursues.  The military man {merely} executes their orders…"[11]

 

And so, it came as a surprise when MacArthur, the brilliant general, who had lead successful operations during World War Two, was to let his arrogance get the better of him. In what has become known as the Truman-MacArthur controversy, it would equally highlight the extent to which Truman's Wilsonian principles was to be subordinated and usurped by an increasingly militaristic  style of US foreign policy that had last been seen since the previous century.

 

In all fairness, policy-makers are the last people in the world to be told how imperfect a world we live in.  But when all is said and done, they are human too, and inevitably, have feet of clay.  They indisputably, on occasion, suffer from human failings, such as misperception, fear, pride or what Goessinger appropriately calls "hubris". For having succumbed to this failing. MacArthur was no exception.

 

Coming of the Yalu Offensive?

It was not long before he would prove and demonstrate his worthiness and skill.  In mid-September 1950, MacArthur "masterminded his last hurrah, a tactically brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon that brought American armed forces back to Seoul nearly five years to the day after they had first set foot on Korean soil."[12]

 

 

With this bold, sweeping strike, MacArthur was single-handedly able to drive the invading North Koreans back across the 38^th parallel from which they had instigated the war.  Emboldened by his success, MacArthur decided to drive them north to the Yalu River -- an abortive move that was to cost him dearly not only in terms of strategy, but more importantly, the eyes of posterity.

 

 

Many a historian has considered this botch-up to be something the general could have avoided.  Especially since this highly controversial decision would have most likely invoked the fury of the Chinese, whom Truman wanted at all costs to not get involved with.

 

 

Nevertheless, MacArthur was a stubborn man.  Spanier is particularly incisive in his criticism of him: "his hypersensitivity to criticism led him to equate criticism with disloyalty and to allay responsibility for his predicaments and failures upon his civilian and military superiors in Washington."[13]

 

 

Much as the general can be considered one of the prime exponents of a modern and amoral realpolitik, it beggars belief that with his military record and skill, he was so acutely myopic as to not have anticipated the potentially adverse ramifications that the advance on Yalu generated.

 

In retrospect, it appears MacArthur's whole strategy was predicated on an unusual arrogant assumption that the Chinese aiding and abetting of the North Koreans was of negligible concern: "The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria.  Of these, probably not more than 100 to 125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River…if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter."[14]

 

Perhaps, it would be too simplistic to level the charge of complacency towards MacArthur, but it remains clear that there are authors out there who level this very accusation.  Small wonder this is the case considering that his arrogance was increasingly becoming a function of his work as UN Supreme Commander. 

 

 

One of the authors is once again Spanier who questions why "MacArthur insisted upon advancing to the Manchurian frontier with his entire army."[15] He answers this by emphasizing four important points.

 

 

First, since it was the political aim of the war to unite Korea, any failure to do so would perhaps have been perceived as weakness.  Secondly, MacArthur held an inveterate conviction that "only resolute action would forestall extensive Chinese intervention.  Thirdly, MacArthur did not think that the Chinese would base their strategy on hydroelectric facilities, which were controlled by the United Nations.  Finally, the general held the strong belief that "an advance to the Yalu was the only feasible military course."[16]

 

 

Perhaps it bears making clear that MacArthur was not the only one who held the inveterate belief that the Chinese would not go to the aid of the North Koreans as they had intimated. That these people in question employed so-called "Volunteers" was testament of their endearing commitment and support for their allies.

 

 

It was actually both Truman and MacArthur who "were convinced that the Chinese neither would nor could intervene in Korea and relied on frequent pronouncements of America's non-aggressive intentions to reassure the Chinese leaders."[17]

 

However, was this attitude borne out of a true desire for accommodation and what MacArthur would perceive to be "appeasement," or was it undiluted naivete?  The historical balance sheet indicates more of the latter: "that the illusion of a firm Sino-Soviet friendship underlying a Communist veneer persisted in the face of growing evidence to the contrary suggests that the US was not yet prepared to take the new China seriously."[18]

 

From this point onwards, the road to hell became increasingly paved with good intentions as the US government doggedly multiplied their efforts to arrest the crisis -- but it proved abortive.  This was because "on the other side of the Yalu, the Chinese leaders regarded the US as heir to Japan's imperialist ambitions in Asia…"[19] Furthermore, "the world as viewed from Peking presented a picture of implacable American hostility."[20]

 

 

In fact, critical to the understanding of the Truman-MacArthur confrontation is the decision at the Yalu River. MacArthur emerged from this ignominious action not only with a rude shock to disturb his resolutely complacent attitude, but an equally embittered outlook of the stakes and the whole war.

 

Where Truman was advocating, even admonishing, caution, MacArthur was insisting on gung-ho tactics that would ultimately have disastrous consequences. This is exemplified by Spanier who writes: "President Truman and his advisers agreed with the allies that air and naval bombardment of Communist China would probably result in a world war"[21], which no-one -- least of all Truman -- was prepared to risk.

 

Conversely, MacArthur "was unwilling to reconcile himself to the limitation of the war to the Korean peninsula, particularly after the failure of the Chinese Communists to drive his troops into the sea had indicated that their armies were not, despite their large numbers and the privilege of a Manchurian sanctuar, was immune to defeat."[22]

 

Although this dogged persistence sent alarm bells ringing for Truman, already beginning to see the excessively militaristically-minded general, he stuck by MacArthur still insisting that a war with China ought to be avoided at all costs.  Yet still, MacArthur pressed on.  After his ignominious defeat at Yalu, he was bent on averting an exercise in futility that would leave him with egg on his face; he was too used to success to envisage any other scenario.

 

 

But such as is the undulating world of high politics, events changed and, true to form, MacArthur now began to seal his own fate.  His first thread began with the suggestion that atomic bombs be dropped on China.  His plan would be to stage a repeat of the success at Inchon -- "except on a far larger scale."[23]

 

 

According to Spanier however, there was nothing to indicate at the Senate hearings that such aplan ever came into fruition. "This is not to say that it did not exist either in MacArthur's mind or on Tokyo's planning boards…but MacArthur has always denied that he at any time recommended the employment of atomic weapons or bombs in the Korean War."[24]

 

 

Cumings seems to consider this view apocryphal for he writes that from his research into British sources, as early as December 9 1950, "MacArthur requested commander's discretion to use atomic weapons."[25] So intense was his zeal that "on December 24, he {had} submitted a list of retardation targets for which he needed twenty-six atomic bombs.  He also wanted four to drop the 'invasion forces'…"[26]

 

To many analysts, as to myself, this is unequivocal proof that MacArthur was way up on a high horse.  A cartoon in the Spanier book quite clearly shows MacArthur in his inimitable style -- General's hat, donning a cigar and wearing a scarf -- walking away from a horse with very tall legs, with a huge piece of paper in his hands with the words "You're Fired" on it, and signed "H.T." The heading is as appropriate as Stoessinger's usage of the word "hubris" to characterize the genesis of the conflict: "It had to happen."

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

In the final analysis, it did happen.  Truman truly had had enough.  It had become increasingly clear that the gap between him and the general was unbridgeable: "The President wanted the war to end while the general wanted it to continue. 'I'll show that son of a bitch who's boss.  Who does he think he is -- God?'  "[27] Truman is supposed to have exclaimed.

 

          On April 10 1951, President Harry Truman finally "with the courage for forthright action that never seemed to fail him in a crisis, dismissed General MacArthur from all his commands -- as UN Commander; US Commander-in Chief, Far East; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powersin Japan; and Commanding General, US Army, Far East."[28] A long, bitter and acrimonious period had finally ended.

 

 

 

In conclusion, I have not found one historian out there writing about the conflict who has not justified Truman's decision to relieve MacArthur of his functions. Even if some may go as far as asserting that there is more than one reason for his dismissal[29], no-one can neither escape nor deny the truth that it was MacArthur's pure and simple insubordination that culminate din his sacking.  He had "challenged the President's role as the nation's spokesman on foreign policy"[30]

 

For that reason, and that reason alone, he had to go.  In any democracy, only the civilian man must make the ultimate decision.  About this, there ought to be no question.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Reference Works

 

Adie, Kate. (Foreword). The Twentieth Century Year by Year. Millenium Edition. Marshall Edition. 1999. {own copy}

 

Cook, Chris. Dictionary of Historical Terms. Second Edition. Gramercy Books. New York. 1998. {own copy}

 

Lane, Peter. Revise World History. Charles Letts & Co. Ltd. London, Edinburgh & New York. 1984. {own copy}

 

Watson, Jack. Success in Twentieth Century World Affairs. Third Edition. John Murray Publishers. London. 1985. {own copy}

 

 

 

Primary Sources

 

Ferencz, Benjamin  B. Documents 51(a) Security Council Deliberations. June-July 1950. IN Enforcing International Law – A Way To World Peace --  A Documentary Analysis – Volume Two. Oceana Publications, INC. USA, London, Rome. 1983. {VUB: R-341-G-FERE-83: 2}

 

Ferencz, Benjamin  B. Documents 51(b) Assembly Resolutions on Chinese aggression. May 1951 IN Enforcing International Law – A Way To World Peace --  A Documentary Analysis – Volume Two. Oceana Publications, INC. USA, London, Rome. 1983. {VUB: R-341-G-FERE-83: 2}

 

Ferencz, Benjamin  B. Documents 51(c) Korean Armistice Agreement – July 1953 IN Enforcing International Law – A Way To World Peace --  A Documentary Analysis – Volume Two. Oceana Publications, INC. USA, London, Rome. 1983. {VUB: R-341-G-FERE-83: 2}

 

Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur And His Rendezvous With History. Alfred A Knopf. New York. 1956 {ULB: 8NIV-940.53-MACA-ZW}

 

 

Secondary Sources

 

Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton University Press. 1981. {ULB: 8NIV-951.904-CUMI-v.1}

 

Cumings, Bruce & Jon Haliday. Korea: The Unknown War. Viking. Penguin Books Ltd. England. 1988. {VUB: ESP-327.5-L KN-HALL-88}

 

Gibbons, S.R. & P.Morican. The League of Nations and UNO. Longman Group Limited. London. 1973. {own copy}

 

Lacey, Michael J. (Ed.). The Truman Presidency. Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars & Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1989 {VUB: HIS-950-L-USA-LACE-89}

 

Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The Korean War. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. 1959 {VUB: BIBL-327.6-L-USA-SPAN-59}

 

Srivastava, M.P. The Korean Conflict. Search For Unification Prentice Hall of India. Private Limited. New Delhi. 1982. {VUB:ESP-327.5-L-KN-SRIV-82}

 

Tertiary Sources

 

Meisler, Stanley. United Nations. The First Fifty Years. Atlantic Monthly Press. New York. 1995. {own copy}